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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to study an optimal structure of a system of international gas
pipelines competing for a gas market. We develop a game-dynamic model of the operation
of several interacting gas pipeline projects with project owners acting as players in the
game. The model treats the projects’ commercialization times as major players’ controls.
Current quantities of gas supply are modeled as approximations to Nash equilibrium points
in instantaneous “gas supply games”, in which each player maximizes his/her current
netproﬁt due to the sales of gas. We use the model to analyze the Turkish gas market,
on which gas routes originating from Russia, Turkmenistan and Iran are competing. The
analysis is carried out in three steps. At step 1, we model the operation of the pipelines as
planned and estimate the associated proﬁts. At step 2, we optimize individual projects,
with respect to their proﬁts, assuming that the other pipelines operate as planned. At
step 3, we ﬁnd numerical Nash equilibrium commercialization policies for the entire group
of the pipelines. The simulations show the degrees to which the planned regimes are not
optimal compared to the Nash equilibrium ones. Another observation is that in equilibrium
regimes the pipelines are not always being run at their full capacities, which implies that
the proposed pipeline capacities might not be optimal. The simulation results turn out to
be moderately sensitive to changes in the discount rate and highly sensitive to changes in
the price elasticity of gas demand.
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1 Introduction
The routing of oil and gas pipelines in Asia and especially in the Caspian region is at the
center of the geopolitics of energy. Various countries in the Caspian region are playing the
pipeline game to get access to one of the most promising markets in the region: Turkey.
Turkey’s gas demand is expected to quintuple by 2010 (see [EIA, 1999, 2000]). Russia’s
Gazprom proposes to build the “Blue Stream” pipeline under the Black Sea to expand its
current gas deliveries to Turkey. Turkmenistan, backed by the USA, is heading for the
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to deliver gas to Turkey. This pipeline would ﬂow underneath
the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia on to Turkey (see [EIA, 1999, 2000]).
Meanwhile, the Iranians have completed their own gas pipeline to the Turkish border and
are awaiting the Turkish side of the pipeline to be completed (see [Ignatius, 2000]). It
seems that some of countries are moving ahead fast so as to preempt the investments
decisions of others, making it unattractive to build a new transmission pipeline since the
market is not big enough. In addition gas could and actually is being shipped to Turkey
in the form of LNG from Algeria and Egypt.
To increase the complication, Turkey is not the only relevant gas market for the three
suppliers. Gazprom has expressed a desire for diversiﬁcation of export routes. Gas market
liberalization in Europe is expected to lower prices which lowers the rate of return of
large scale investments in the Yamal peninsula or the Barents Sea. Gazprom is actively
looking for new markets in the Asia Paciﬁc (China) and the Middle-East (Turkey) (see
[Makarov, 1999]), and several pipelines have been proposed to China. Turkmenistan could
also deliver gas to China or to India and Pakistan (see [Klaassen et al., 2001a]). Iran is
looking into the option to pipe gas to India as well.
The literature basically distinguishes three approaches to analyze gas infrastructure
development and gas exports: partial equilibrium models, game-theoretical models, and
energy-ﬂow optimization models. Examples of the ﬁrst modeling approach are [Golombek
et al., 1995], [Van Oostvoorn, and Boots, 1999], and [Beltramo et al., 1986]. Game-
theoretical models for the gas market have been developed in [Brekke et al., 1987, 1991],
[Berg et al., 1998], [Haurie, Smeers, and Zaccour, 2000], and [Wolf, and Smeers, 1997].
*The author was partially supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research, Grant
02-01-00769, and the Program for the Sponsorship of Leading Scientific Schools, Grant 791.2003.1.
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Energy-ﬂow optimization models are numerous. A few dealing explicitly with gas trade
and infrastructure in Asia are [Sugiyama, 1999], and [Fujii, and Yamaji, 1999]. The
strength of the partial equilibrium models is the fact that can easily deal with market
liberalization aspects. Their weakness is the lack of dynamics in the path towards achieving
the equilibrium. The game-theoretical models explicitly model the investment dynamics
but results can be path dependent and the scope of the models (number of players and
investments) is limited. The optimization models can deal with technological progress and
investments but miss the eﬀects of strategic investment decisions on prices and energy
demand, and due to their single optimization objective are less able to deal with the eﬀect
of market development.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine the long-term
prospects for gas infrastructure in Central Asia taking into account the eﬀect of strategic
behavior as well as the eﬀect of diﬀerent market arrangements (take-or-pay or liberalized
markets). The suggested model explicitly incorporates lumpy investments in individual
pipelines and individual countries as separate decision makers. The model diﬀers from op-
timization models since it incorporates multiple actors which maximize proﬁts taking into
account the eﬀect of their actions on prices and gas demand. The model is constructed on
the basis of classical micro and macro patterns of mathematical economics (see [Arrow,
1985], [Intriligator, 1971]). It employs methods of ﬁnancial arithmetics (see [Cartledge,
1993], and operates with constructions of ﬁnancial mathematics and investments theory
[Sharpe et al., 1999]). The model combines four microeconomic levels of dynamic opti-
mization: assessment of the market potential innovation, selection of innovation scenarios,
regulation of the future supply and optimization of the current investments, through the
price formation mechanism into a macroeconomic system.
The approach expands the existing game-theoretic models (see [Pontryagin et al., 1962],
[Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]) since it views investment decisions as a dynamic process
rather than a yes/no decision making. A crucial decision is the choice of the commercial-
ization time of the project, i.e., the time of ﬁnalizing the construction of the pipeline and
starting gas deliveries. Elements of optimal timing models (see [Barzel, 1968], [Tarasyev,
Watanabe, 2001]) constitute the basis for a reasonable optimization setting in terms of the
commercialization time, or, equivalently, the delivery time. A right individual choice of
the commercialization time could be the best response to the choices of the other competi-
tors or a reasonable analogue of the best reply dynamics (see [Hofbauer, Sigmund, 1988],
[Kryazhimskii, Osipov, 1995]). Accordingly, a collection of commercialization times is
suitable to every competitor if and only if the commercialization time of every competitor
responds best to the commercialization times of the other competitors. Such situations
can be associated with Nash equilibria in the game between the competing gas pipeline
projects. The analogous approach based on the best reply dynamics is employed in the
paper to model Nash equilibrium of gas deliveries and market gas price. We prove rigor-
ously the existence results for Nash equilibrium of gas deliveries and prices and outline
approach for ﬁnding Nash equilibrium of commercialization times.
The approach was announced in [Klaassen, Roehrl, Tarasyev, 2001b] and partially
tested in [Golovina, Klaassen, Roehrl, 2002]; a formal mathematical background (restricted
so far to the case of 2 competing gas pipeline projects) was elaborated in [Klaassen,
Kryazhimskii, Tarasyev, 2001c]
The paper has the following structure.
Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 presents an approach to ﬁnding equilibrium commercialization strategies in
game-type interactions between pipeline projects.
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Section 4 summarizes the data used for the numerical analysis of the Turkey gas market.
Section 5 discusses results of numerical simulations.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Outline of Model
In the suggested model, pipeline projects competing for a gas market are numbered
1, . . . , L. Throughout the paper, t stands for the time variable.
The life circle of every pipeline project i comprises the investment period and supply
period. The investment period starts at time 0 and terminates (starting the supply period)
at the commercialization time ti when the accumulated investment xi(t) in the project
reaches a prescribed commercialization level xi. The duration of the supply period, Ti,
is prescribed. During the supply period, at every time t gas of quantity zi(t) ≤ Mi is
supplied through pipeline i; here Mi is the maximum capacity of this pipeline. Supply
zi(t) is chosen so as to maximize the current proﬁt, Ri(t), due to the sales of gas. As
other projects follow the same strategy of supply, zi(t) constitutes the ith component of
a Nash equilibrium point in the instantaneous “beneﬁt maximization supply game” (see
[Klaassen, Kryazhimskii, Tarasyev, 2001c]).
2.2 Project’s Parameters and Variables
For each gas pipeline project i the characteristic constants are t0i - starting time for the
investment period,
x0i - the starting capital invested at time t
0
i ,
xi > x
0
i - the level of commercialization capital,
σi - rate of obsolescence of accumulated investments,
λi - investments discount rate,
γi - investments delay coeﬃcient,
Mi - maximum capacity,
Ti - lifetime of the pipeline.
The dynamics of project i is expressed in terms of the following variables:
ti ≥ t
0
i - commercialization time,
ri(t) - current investment at time t,
xi(t) - accumulated investments at time t,
Wi(ti) - investment cost,
zi(t) - current supply,
yi(t) - current accumulated supply,
C1i (t) = C
1
i (t, yi(t)) - current cost of extraction of gas,
C2i (t) - current cost of transportation of gas,
C3i (t) - transit fees,
Ci(t) - current overall cost of delivering gas to market,
Ri(t) - current proﬁt due to sales of gas,
Πi - overall proﬁt.
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2.3 Project’s Dynamics: Investment Period
For each project i, the investment period starts at the ﬁxed time t0i and terminates at the
project’s commercialization time ti viewed as a changeable control variable. The process
of growth of the accumulated investment, xi(t), is modeled by the diﬀerential equation
x˙i(t) = ri(t)− σixi(t) (2.1)
with the initial condition
xi(t
0
i ) = x
0
i (2.2)
and ﬁnal condition
xi(ti) = xi. (2.3)
The time-varying investment rate ri(t) is chosen so as to minimize the total expenditure
Ei(ti, ri) =
∫ ti
t0
i
e−λitrγii (t)dt.
In [Tarasyev, Watanabe, 2001] it was shown that the minimum expenditure, or investment
cost, equals
Wi(ti) = ρ
αi−1
e−λti(xi − x
0
i e
−σ(ti−t
0
i
))(
1− e−ρi(ti−t
0
i
)
)α−1 , (2.4)
where
ρi =
αiσi + λi
αi − 1
, αi =
1
γi
,
and the minimizing investment rate is given by
ri(t) = ρ
eσ(ti−t
0
i )xi − x
0
i
eρi(ti−t
0
i
)−1
(t0i ≤ t ≤ ti) (2.5)
2.4 Market’s Parameters and Variables
Below, the abbreviation GDP stands for the “Gross Domestic Product of the gas market”
and abbreviation LNG stands for “liquid natural gas”. The gas market is characterized
by the following constants and variables: ey - GDP elasticity of gas demand,
ep - price elasticity of gas demand,
Mlng - maximal capacity of LNG terminals,
G(t) - GDP,
Plng(t) - world market price for LNG,
d(t) - current demand of gas,
z(t) - current total supply of gas,
P0(t) = P0(t, z(t)) - current price of gas, given no competition with LNG;
P (t) = P (t, z(t)) - actual current price of gas.
The evolution of the GDP, G(t), and price for LNG, Plng(t), are formed exogenously.
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2.5 Price Formation Mechanism
Note that for each pipeline i the supply period starts at time ti and terminates at time
ti + Ti; therefore, we set
zi(t) = 0 if t ≤ ti or t > ti + Ti. (2.6)
Current total gas supply, z(t), is the sum of current individual supplies:
z(t) = z1(t) + . . .+ zL(t). (2.7)
Current market gas demand, d(t), is determined by the current GDP, G(t), and the
current price of gas, P (t):
d(t) = AGey(t)P−ep(t);
here A is a demand scale coeﬃcient. The market equilibrium condition, z(t) = d(t), gives
rise to the price formation mechanism
P0(t) = P0(t, z(t)) = A
1/epG(t)
ey/ep
z(t)1/ep
. (2.8)
Taking into account that the price of gas, P (t), can not exceed the price of LNG,
Plng(t),
P (t) ≤ Plng(t),
we come to the following ﬁnal formula for the price of gas:
P (t) = P (t, z(t)) = min{P0(t, z(t)), Plng(t)} = min
{
A1/ep
G(t)ey/ep
z(t)1/ep
, Plng(t)
}
. (2.9)
2.6 Instantaneous Supply Game
For pipeline i, the current overall cost of delivering a unit of gas to market is found as
Ci(t) = C
1
i (t, yi(t)) +C
2
i (t) +C
3
i (t)
where the accumulated supply yi(t) is subject to
y˙i(t) = zi(t),
and the current proﬁt due to sales of gas is given by
Ri(t) = Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) = zi(t)(P (t, z(t))− Ci(yi(t))). (2.10)
We suggest that at every time t the collection of current individual gas supplies,
z1(t), . . . , zL(t), forms a Nash equilibrium point in the instantaneous supply game be-
tween players 1, . . . , L, in which each player i (responsible for pipeline i) maximizes the
current proﬁt Ri(t) = Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) choosing zi(t) between 0 and Mi provided
ti + Ti ≥ t ≥ ti (recall that zi(t) = 0 if t < ti or t > ti + Ti).
Proposition 2.1 For every collection of commercialization times, t1, . . . , tL, and every t
located between the starting time of supply,
t0 = min{t1, . . . , tL},
and the final time of supply,
t0 = max{t1 + T1, . . . , tL + TL},
the instantaneous supply game has a Nash equilibrium point.
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Proof. Fix an arbitrary t ∈ [t0, t
0]. Recall that an amount zi(t) of gas supply is
admissible for player i (at time t) if zi(t) ∈ [0,Mi] provided t ∈ ti, ti + Ti] and zi(t) = 0
otherwise. Substituting (2.9) in (2.10), we get
Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) = min{A
1/epG(t)
ey/epzi(t)
z(t)1/ep
− Ci(yi(t))zi(t),
zi(t)(Plng(t)− Ci(yi(t)))}.
Clearly, Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) is concave in zi(t). For every collection of admissible individ-
ual supplies, (z1(t), . . . , zL(t)), let Bi(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) be the set of all best reply supplies
of player i, i.e., those maximizing the player’s proﬁt Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , z
′
i(t), . . . zL(t)) over all
supplies z′i(t) admissible for this player. The best reply map associates every collection of
admissible individual supplies, (z1(t), . . . , zL(t)), with the product
B(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) = B1(z1(t), . . . , zL(t))× . . .× BL(z1(t), . . . , zL(t))
of players’ best replies. The multi-valued function B(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) map the set Π of
all collections (z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) of admissible individual supplies into itself. The set Π
is a convex compactum in the L - dimensional Euclidean space RL. One can easily
show that B(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) is upper semi-continuous (see [Kantorovich, Akilov, 1982],
[Rudin, 1991]). Finally, due to the concavity of the proﬁt functions Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t))
in zi(t), the best reply sets B(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) are convex. Thus, B(z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) is
an upper-semicontinuous convex-valued map of a convex compactum Π into itself. By
the Kakutani theorem (see [Kantorovich, Akilov, 1982], [Rudin, 1991], [Kakutani, 1941]).
there exists a (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) such that (z
∗
1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) ∈ B(z
∗
1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)). Clearly,
(z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) is a Nash equilibrium point in the instantaneous supply game.
The proposition is proved.
Remark 2.1 Let I(t) be the set of the indices i of all pipelines operating at time t (i.e.
such that t ∈ [ti, ti + Ti]), and L(t) be the number of these pipelines. Set
z∗(t) =
(
AG(t)ey/ep∑
i∈I(t)Ci
(epL− 1)
)ep
, (2.11)
z∗i (t) = epz
∗(t)
(
1−
Ci(t)z
∗(1/ep)(t)
AG(t)ey/ep
)
(2.12)
for every i ∈ I(t) and z∗i (t) = 0 for every i ∈ I(t). One can show that if
ep >
1
L(t)
, (2.13)
P (t, z∗(t)) < Plng(t) (2.14)
and
z∗i (t) ≤Mi (2.15)
for all i ∈ I(t), then (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) is a Nash equilibrium point in the instantaneous
supply game.
Proof. Indeed, note, ﬁrst, that by (2.15) collection (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) is admissible. By
(2.12)
L∑
i=1
z∗i (t) = epz
∗(t)L(t)−
z∗(1/ep+1)(t)
∑
i∈I(t)Ci(t)
AG(t)ey/ep
;
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hence, by (2.11) and by (2.13)
L∑
i=1
z∗i (t) = z
∗(t).
Assumption (2.14) and expression (2.9) for price P (t) imply
P (t, z∗(t)) = A1/ep
G(t)ey/ep
z∗(1/ep)(t)
.
Substituting this in (2.10), we get
Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) = A
1/epG(t)
ey/epzi(t)
z(t)1/ep
− Ci(yi(t)zi(t). (2.16)
for all admissible (z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) varying in a neighborhood of (z
∗
1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) Since
Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t)) is concave in zi(t), the equality
∂Ri(t, z
∗
1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t))
∂zi(t)
= 0 (2.17)
holding for all i ∈ I(t) is suﬃcient for (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) to be a Nash equilibrium point.
Take an i ∈ I(t). The diﬀerentiation of (2.16) brings (2.17) to the form
A
G(t)ey/ep
z∗(1/ep)
− Ci −
z∗i (t)AG(t)
ey/ep
z∗(1/ep+1)
= 0 (2.18)
Substituting (2.12) we ﬁnd that (2.18) is true. Thus, (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) is a Nash equilib-
rium point in the instantaneous supply game.
2.7 Best Reply Policy for Gas Supply Regulation
Generally, there is no clear analytic formula for a Nash equilibrium (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) in the
instantaneous supply game. Therefore, we approximate (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)) by a collection
of players’ best reply supply regulation policies. The best reply supply regulation policy
for player i is modeled as
z˙i(t) = Si[−sign(zi(t)) + sign(Mi − zi(t)) + (2.19)
sign(
∂Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t))
∂zi
)]
zi(ti) = 0, (ti ≤ t ≤ ti + Ti).
This supply regulation policy prescribes supply zi(t) to stay between 0 and Mi, and grow
(respectively , decline) whenever ∂Ri(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t))/∂zi is positive (respectively, neg-
ative). The positive parameter Si characterizes the ability of player i to react to changes
on market. A solution to each of the diﬀerential equations (2.19) with the discontinuous
right hand side is understood in the sense of Filippov (see [Filippov, 1988]).
Remark 2.2 If all Si are suﬃciently large then, typically, a collection of zi(t)’s driven by
(2.19) lies close to a Nash equilibrium (z∗1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)). Suﬃcient conditions for this are
given in Remark 2.1. Here, we omit a mathematical justiﬁcation for this fact and just view
(2.19) as a rational individual gas supply policy intended to approximate the ith compo-
nent, z∗i (t), of a Nash equilibrium point, (z
∗
1(t), . . . , z
∗
L(t)), in the current instantaneous
gas supply game.
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3 An Approach to Equilibrium Commercialization
3.1 Overall Proﬁts, Individual Best Replies and Equilibrium Commer-
cialization Times
For each player i projects’ commercialization times, t1, . . . , tL, determine the player’s
overall proﬁt, Πi, by
Πi = Πi(t1, . . . , tL) = −Wi(ti) +
∫ ti+Ti
ti
e−λtRi(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t))dt; (3.20)
here Wi(ti) and Ri(ti) are given by (2.4) and (2.10), and z1(t), . . . , zL(t) are modeled
by (2.19), (2.6). A commercialization time t∗i of pipeline i is a best reply of player i to
commercialization times t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tL of other pipelines if t
∗
i maximizes Πi over
all ti > t
0
i :
Πi(t1, . . . , ti−1, t
∗
i , ti+1, . . . , tL) = max
ti>0
Πi(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti, ti+1, . . . , tL).
A collection t∗1, . . . , t
∗
L of pipelines’ commercialization times constitutes a Nash equilib-
rium if for every player i, t∗i is a best reply of this player to the commercialization times
t∗1, . . . , t
∗
i−1, t
∗
i+1, . . . , t
∗
L of pipelines 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , L.
3.2 Best Reply Policy for Investment Regulation
An individual best reply investment policy described in this subsection presents a model for
individual reviewing current investment plans basing on a currently available information.
In the next subsection we will show that the collection of individual best reply investment
policies provides a tool to ﬁnding current Nash equilibrium commercialization times.
We assume that during the investment period, each player i updates his/her current
investments basing on the current information on the projects’ commercialization times.
Suppose player i makes his/her investment updates at times
τ0i = t
0
i , τ
1
i = t
0
i + δ, τ
2
i = τ
1
i + δ, . . . ,
with a small time step δ. At each time τki player i observes the current projected com-
mercialization times of all projects, t1 = t1(τ
k
i ) = t
k
1 , . . . , tL = tL(τ
k
i ) = t
k
L, and changes
his/her own projected commercialization time ti = ti(τ
k
i ) = t
k
i to ti = ti(τ
k+1
i ) = t
k+1
i . In
order to ﬁnd a tk+1i , player i analyzes his/her proﬁt subsequent to τ
k
i ,
Πki (ti) = −W
k
i (ti) +
∫ ti+Ti
ti
e−λtRi(t, z
k
1(t), . . . , z
k
i−1(t), zi(t), z
k
i+1(t), . . . , z
k
L(t))dt, (3.21)
as a function of a (changeable) projected commercialization time ti ≥ τ
k
i . In (3.21)W
k
i (ti),
is the investment subsequent to τki ; a formula for W
k
i (ti) is obtained from (2.4), if one
replaces the initial time t0i and initial investment x
0
i in (2.4) by the current time τ
k
i and
current investment
xki = xi(τ
k
i ), (3.22)
respectively:
W ki (ti) = ρ
αi−1
e−λti(xi − x
k
i e
−σ(ti−τ
k
i ))(
1− e−ρi(ti−τ
k
i
)
)α−1 . (3.23)
The individual supply policies zi(t) and zj(t) = z
k
j (t), (j = i) in (3.21) are modeled by
(2.19), (2.6) with tj = t
k
j , (j = i). As a result of the analysis of Π
k
i (ti), player i chooses a
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new projected commercialization time, tk+1i , as a maximizer to Π
k
i (ti), or a best reply to
the currently projected commercialization times of other players:
Πki (t
k+1
i ) = max
ti≥τki
Πki (ti).
Finally, basing on the new projected commercialization time tk+1i , player i determines
his/her investment plan rki (t) for the period between τ
k
i and τ
k+1
i ; namely, r
k
i (t) is set to
be the cost minimizing investment plan for the current time τki and current accumulated
investment xki (see (3.22)); a formula for r
k
i (t) is obtained from (2.5) if one replaces the
initial time t0i and initial accumulated investment x
0
i in (2.5) by τ
k
i and x
k
i , respectively:
rki (t) = ρ
eσ(ti−τ
k
i )xi − x
k
i
eρi(ti−τ
k
i
)−1
(τki ≤ t ≤ min{τ
k+1
i , t
k+1
i }).
This ﬁnalizes the description of the best reply investment policy for player i.
3.3 Finding Equilibrium Commercialization Times
Assume that each player applies the best reply investment updating policy described in
the previous subsection.
In what follows, we use the “universal” sequence of investment update instances,
τ0, τ1, . . .:
τ0 = min
i=1,...,L
τ0i = min
i=1,...,L
t0i , τ
k+1 = τk + δ.
We also assume that for any i we have
t0i − τ
0 = miδ
with some integer mi, or, equivalently,
t0i = τ
mi .
Note that if δ is suﬃciently small, this assumption practically does not restrict us in
generality. Then, clearly,
τki = τ
mi+k.
Accordingly, we enumerate the projected players’ commercialization times tki , introducing
t
mi+k
i = t
k
i , t
j
i = t
0
i (j = 0, . . . , mi − 1).
At every current investment updating time τk, the subsequent proﬁt for player i is
given by
Πki (t1, . . . , tL) = −W
k
i (ti) +
∫ ti+Ti
ti
e−λtRi(t, z1(t), . . . , zL(t))dt
(see (3.20)) whereW ki (ti) is deﬁned by (3.23),Ri(ti) is given by (2.10), and z1(t), . . . , zL(t)
are modeled by (2.19), (2.6). A commercialization time t∗ki of pipeline i is a best reply of
player i to commercialization times t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tL at time τ
k if t∗ki maximizes Π
k
i
over all ti > τ
k:
Πki (t1, . . . , ti−1, t
∗k
i , ti+1, . . . , tL) = max
ti>0
Πi(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti, ti+1, . . . , tL).
A collection t∗k1 , . . . , t
∗k
L of pipelines’ commercialization times constitutes a Nash equilib-
rium at time τk if for every player i, t∗ki is a best reply of this player at time τ
k to the
commercialization times t∗k1 , . . . , t
∗k
i−1, t
∗k
i+1, . . . , t
∗k
L of pipelines 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , L.
The following proposition can easily be proved.
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Table 1: Overview of gas routes in the model.
Regions Comments
Supply Russia Russian, West Siberian and Caspian gas ﬁelds.
The huge East Siberian gas amounts will be
treated in a future extension of the model.
“Central Asian
Producers” (CAP)
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
LNG from World Market Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria
Demand Turkey Transition of gas to Western and Eastern
Europe
Transit countries Azerbaidjan, Armenia,
Georgia, Iran, Russia
Possible gas routes through the Ukraine
Proposition 3.2 Let each player apply the best reply investment policy and t
0
i , t
1
i , . . . be
the associated sequence of updated commercialization times for player i (i = 1, 2, . . . , L).
If all these sequences stabilize at some step m, i.e., t
j
i = t
m
i for all j = m+1, m+2, . . . and
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , L, then t
m
1 , . . .t
m
L is a Nash equilibrium collection of commercialization
times at every time τ j with j ≥ m.
Proposition 3.2 shows that the collection of individual best reply investment policies
provides a tool to ﬁnding current Nash equilibrium commercialization times.
Remark 3.3 If initial times t01, . . . , t
0
L are close to each other and, for a stabilization
iteration m, τm lies close to all of them, then Nash equilibrium commercialization times
t
m
1 , . . . t
m
L at time τ
m provide a reasonable approximation to seek Nash equilibrium times
t∗1, . . . , t
∗
L.
4 Data for Numerical Analysis
4.1 Overview of Turkey Gas Market
The purpose of the ﬁrst application of the model is to study the investment scenarios into
gas pipeline routes to Turkey. The time horizon of the model is 1998-2050.
The future versions of the model may consider extensions to alternative demand gas
markets such as China, India, Japan, and Western Europe. Another extension of the
model may infer that a part of gas supply to Turkey can be exported to Western and
Eastern Europe. Table 1 provides an overview of possible gas pipeline routes for the case
study of the energy market in Turkey.
4.2 Gas Supply
Masters and Turner [1998] provide an illustration of the geographical location of gas ﬁelds
in the Caspian Sea region. Russia and Iran (Iran holds 15% of the world’s gas reserves, see
[EIA, 1999, 2000]) hold truly gigantic amounts. Amounts in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
are much smaller and are of the similar order as the North Sea Gas Reserves.
Many energy-systems models (e.g., MESSAGE, see [Strubegger, and Messner, 1995])
use cumulative gas supply cost curves. The expected cost of gas extraction depend on the
cumulative amount of extracted gas. We follow (just as in MESSAGE) the classiﬁcation
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Figure 1: Cumulative gas supply cost curves.
method developed in [Rogner, 1997]. He distinguishes eight diﬀerent cost categories for
gas extraction according to their economic and technical feasibility. Technological progress
in gas extraction continuously transforms higher categories into lower categories.
In our analysis we use the regional data from the World Energy Assessment Report
(see [WEA, 2000], This data distribution applied to natural gas categories I-VI generates
cumulative gas supply functions indicated on Figure 1.
The model infers assumptions concerning the exogenous gas demand in Eastern Eu-
rope, Western Europe, Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. These assumptions
are based on recent global long-term energy scenarios (see [Riahi, and Roehl, 2000]) pre-
pared for IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Such exogenous functions
for the model simulation are shown on Figure 2.
As to LNG supply, it is assumed that the maximal capacity of LNG terminals is large
enough to satiate the demand of the energy market in Turkey. The exogenous world
market LNG price is derived from the IIASA-B2 scenario (see [Roehrl, 2000]) and its
dynamics is presented at Figure 3. LNG supply in 2000 is assumed to be 2.8 bcm/year
(billions of cubic meters).
Domestic gas production in Turkey is assumed to be constant at the current level of
0.2 bcm per year (see [EIA, 1999, 2000]).
4.3 Gas Demand
Figure 4 shows natural gas consumption and production in the 1990s for the examined
regions. The diﬀerence between production and consumption constitutes the net exports.
One can observe the strong dominance of Russia both in gas consumption and export. The
huge gas resources based in Russia in comparison with the resources of CAP countries
induce the dominance of the Russian gas export at the Euroasian gas markets in the
long-term perspective.
Demand for natural gas in Turkey is projected to quadruple within 20 years, and several
independent estimates foresee Turkey’s annual consumption reaching 1.4 tcf (trillions of
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Figure 2: Exogenous gas demand functions.
mln$
BCM


	

		
	









          
  
13cmYear
Figure 3: Dynamics of LNG world market price.
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Figure 4: Natural gas consumption and production in 1990s.
cubic feet) by 2020. Gas consumption in Turkey has risen from 1.1 bcm in 1988 to 9.9
bcm in 1998. In 1998 6.8 bcm were imported from Russia through existing pipelines, 3.0
bcm were imported from Algeria in the form of LNG import. Domestic production was
around 0.2 bcm in 1999 (see [EIA, 1999, 2000]) or 2.8% of domestic consumption. Gas
consumption is projected to increase to 25.2 bcm in 2010 and to 165.2 bcm in 2020 (see
[EIA, 1999, 2000]).
We assume in the model that the gas demand depends on GDP (national income)
and the price of gas. Typical price elasticity of the gas demand is around -0.7 for the
industry in Western Europe. In the paper [Golombek et al., 1995] the aggregated price
elasticity covers industrial sectors and markets in 6 countries and is estimated around -
0.93. In the paper [Brekke et al., 1987] the authors used price elasticity of -0.7 and income
elasticity of 0.8 for countries in Western Europe. Preliminary data for Turkey shows
that price elasticity and income elasticity for Turkey can be estimated at quite diﬀerent
levels than in Western Europe:1 price elasticity is around -0.12 and income elasticity is
around 2.93. In other words, the gas demand is driven mainly by GDP growth and is
practically insensitive to price changes. That is not surprising for an emerging economy
with a weak energy infrastructure and rapidly growing energy demand. The fastest growth
of gas consumption in both developed and developing countries is expected in the power
industry, which scales perfectly with GDP growth (see, e.g., [Roehrl, 2000]). Note that the
growth of electricity consumption in Turkey over the next 15 years is expected to reach at
least 8% per year. Currently, 4.2 GW of gas-ﬁred capacity is seeking investment (mainly
according to the Turkish “Build-Operate-Transfer”-Model). Diﬀusion of gas demand to
other sectors of Turkish economy is also expected. Taking into account the most probable
liberalization of Turkish markets, convergence to price elasticity and income elasticity of
today’s Western European economy might be expected.
Figure 5 shows GDP projection for the period from 1998 till 2050 for the considered
1Note that the average gas price for Turkey in 1998 was about 170 US$/1000 cm.
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Figure 5: GDP projection for the period 1998-2050.
regions based on scenario B2 from the new energy scenarios catalogue developed for IPCC
(see [Riahi, and Roehrl, 2000]). Scenario B2 is a “dynamics-as-usual” scenario, which
follows a central path of scenarios set. The same trend will be most likely true for gas
demand.
4.4 Gas Pipelines
4.4.1 Overview
Exporting through the Russian gas pipeline system was the unique option available for
the Caspian region until 1997. Although over 2 tcf of Caspian-region gas was exported
via this system in 1990, exports fell down to 0.3 tcf in 1997 due to disputes between
Turkmenistan gas companies and their competitor – the Russian gas company Gazprom,
who owns gas pipelines. In 1999, Turkmenistan gas companies and Gazprom came to an
agreement allowing Turkmenistan to resume gas exports to the Ukraine. Turkmenistan is
also developing an alternative export route by constructing a new pipeline from Ekarem
(Turkmenistan) to the Iranian border. Limited export though this pipeline started in
1997; the ultimate capacity of the pipeline would be 0.5 tcf.
It is planned to construct several new pipelines. Most of the proposals call for pipelines
with a capacity of 1 tcf each. Three or more pipelines could be built to satiate the gas
demand depending on the extent to which the existing Russian system will supply gas
to European markets. One can mention “Blue Stream” of Russian Gazprom, “Trans-
Caspian” pipeline from Turkmenistan and “Trans-Iranian” pipeline among the proposed
new pipelines bringing gas to Turkey which are in the most advanced planning stage.
These competing pipelines can transport about 3 tcf of natural gas annually to Turkey
and European markets.
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4.5 Existing and Planned Pipeline Projects
Supply to Turkey can come from Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan,
as well as from Egypt and Algeria. This Section provides a brief overview of the major
proposed pipeline projects (see Figure 6).
Gas Export Projects to Turkey.
a) Russia-Ukraine-Bulgaria-Turkey (existing pipeline “Bulgarpipe”).
Through this existing pipeline, 280 bcf were delivered to Turkey in 1998. In December
1997 another 25 year deal was signed between Gazprom and Turkey to deliver 500 bcf
annually by early 2005. To deliver these large amounts either large investments in the
existing pipeline route and contracts with transit countries are needed or new pipeline
connections will be built, e.g. “Blue Stream”.
b) “Blue Stream”.
This project proposes a direct connection between Russia and Turkey under the Black
Sea (to avoid trouble with transit countries). This 758 miles long connection would be
the deepest underwater gas pipeline in the world. It is a technically challenging project
involving huge investments – 4 US $ billion.
c) Turkmenistan into Iran (existing pipeline).
This short connection (only about 190 mill. US $) already exists. Gas export to Iran
began in late 1997 (141 bcf). A capacity extension to 283 bcf is being planned for 2006
together with an extension to Teheran.
d) SWAP deal between Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey.
Example c) may become a part of a large-scale SWAP deal between Turkmenistan,
Iran and Turkey. This plan would require three new pipelines to Turkey (46 inches each).
Although economically reasonable, it faces ﬁerce US opposition which is targeted to con-
tinue to isolate Iran in the region. Supporters of the SWAP deal however claim that it
would not violate the American Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA ) because Iran would only
receive transit fees for moving gas to Turkey rather than exporting gas.
e) Agreement between Turkey and Iran.
In 1996, Iran and Turkey signed a 20 $ - billion agreement that commits Iran to provide
Turkey with natural gas over a period of 22 years. Export of Iranian gas to Turkey was
slated to start in 1999 at initial rate of 300 mmcf/d (millions of cubic feet per day) and
then it is planned to rise rate to a level of 1,000 mmcf/d in 2005. In November 1998,
Turkey began construction of a 623-mile pipeline that could transport gas westward from
Iran. In January 2000 Iran announced that it accepted Turkey’s request to delay the
purchase of Iranian natural gas until September 2001. Turkey declared that it had been
unable to complete its portion of the pipeline due to economic problems. It should be
noted that a part of the pipeline that runs on the Iranian territory has been completed
(see [Ignatius, 2000]). Construction on the Turkish side of the 160 mile of the pipeline
routing from the Iranian border to Erzurum has been slowed.
f) US priority: “Trans-Caspian” Gas Pipeline (TCGP).
For obvious geo-political goals the US government pushes the TCGP project. This
would be a 1050 miles gas pipeline from Turkmenistan underneath the Caspian Sea to
Baku, through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey for approximately 2.5 billion US $. The
ﬁrst agreement was signed in May 1999 to deliver 565 bcf gas by 2002. A part of these
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large amounts are assigned to be exported further to Europe. In parallel with the US
plans this route is also a Turkish priority. However, recently a new large natural gas ﬁeld
was found in Azerbaijan which makes this potential transit country a direct competitor
for Turkmenian gas export. It should be noted that Iran strongly objects to this gas route
on “environmental” grounds and is exerting pressure on Turkmenistan.
g) North Caucasian-Transcaspian Gas Pipeline (NCTGP).
Pipeline NCTGP provides a link by the route Georgia-Armenia-Turkey passing the
Russian pipeline in the Caspian region. Deliveries through this pipeline were cut oﬀ in
1997 due to lack of payments by Georgia for gas deliveries. Furthermore, the link from
Georgia to Armenia was destroyed during the war in 1995. Investments of only 250 million
US $ would be needed to upgrade the pipelines and supply 425 bcf/year of gas to Turkey.
Due to US pressure, Royal Dutch/Shell Company has recently switched from this project
to the TCGP project. Consequently Gazprom now favors the much more expensive “Blue
Stream” project.
h) LNG ports planned in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Baku, and Georgia.
With the intention to export LNG through the Black Sea to Europe a number of LNG
ports are being planned in the region. The planned investments constitute the amount of
about 250 million US $.
i) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Turkey and Egypt.
In June 1998 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between Turkey
and Egypt to build several objects:
• Oﬀshore pipeline under the Mediterranean to deliver Egyptian gas to Gaza, Israel,
Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and to the South-East of Turkey.
• LNG ports to deliver Egyptian LNG to Izmir. This project would require to con-
struct a liquefaction terminal with construction cost of 1.2 billion US $.
Apart from these projects a number of other important projects could be taken into
account in a future model extension, e.g.:
• China pipeline: 5000 miles from Turkmenistan to China with a possible extension
to Japan, capacity - 1 tcf/year, cost - 8.5 billion US $.
• Centgas: Pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afganistan to Pakistan and probably fur-
ther to India; length - 900 miles, cost - 2-2.5 billion US $.
• Pipelines directed to the South of Iran with LNG terminals to export LNG to Asian
countries including Japan.
• Pipeline Iran-Pakistan-India for which MOU was signed in the spring 2000.
Construction cost of new pipelines is assumed to be a function of construction time.
Figure 7 shows graphs of these functions.
An overview of pipelines projects (both oil and gas) in the Caspian region can be found
on the Internet site http://www.eia.doe.gov (source: [EIA, 1999, 2000]).
Table 2 presents the cost estimations and capacity data for pipelines which has been
actually used in the model simulations.
Finally, Figure 8 provides an overview of the main existing pipeline network to deliver
gas from the countries of the Former Soviet Union (mainly Russia, but also Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan) to Western and Eastern Europe.
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Figure 6: Gas Pipeline Routes to Turkey (source: Gas Matters).
Table 2: Cost estimations and capacities for major projects.
Location Name Year
of
start
Gas
capa-
city
[bcm]
Length
[miles]
Inv. Low
Est. [mln
US$]
Inv.
high
est.
[mln
US$]
O&M2
costs
US$ /
bcm
Transit
fees
US$ /
bcm
f) TCGP Trans-
caspian
2002 31.15 1696 2000 3000 8.0 16.9
e) Iran -
Turkey
Iranpipe 2010 28 2400 3900 4100 30.0 0
d)
Turkmenistan-
Iran -
Turkey
SWAP 2009 28.3 2172 3800 4000 13.8 21.6
b) Russia-
Turkey
Blue
Stream
2003 14.16 1220 4000 6000 14.1 0
a) Russia-
Balkan-
Turkey
Bulgarpipe exists 10.2 3500 exists 2500 30 10
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Figure 7: Costs of pipeline construction as a function of construction time.
Figure 8: Main export pipelines from the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to
Western and Eastern Europe (source: Gas Matters).
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It is necessary to stress that geo-political aspects seem to be of the same importance
as economic and ﬁnancial issues for pipeline projects in the Caspian region. Other risks
include uncertainties which can arise due to non-payments for gas deliveries, as well as
due to unresolved legal issues concerning maritime boundaries in the Caspian Sea. Is
the Caspian Sea an inland lake or is it governed by the International Law of the Sea?
The legal status of an inland lake would support joint development projects. However,
if the Caspian Sea is governed by the International Law of the Sea, the law of maritime
boundaries would be applied to pipeline projects.
5 Results of Numerical Simulations
5.1 Basic Scenarios
On the basis of the described model a software package has been developed for numerical
analysis of investments into gas pipeline projects. The package allows to analyze diﬀerent
scenarios of development of gas markets, to estimate optimal proﬁts of investments and
to implement the sensitivity analysis with respect to model parameters.
This section presents the data and results for a number of scenarios when the model
is applied to gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the
international gas transmission routes from Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan to the rapidly
expanding gas market in Turkey.
Following discussions of section 4, two alternative assumptions about the value of price
elasticity at the gas market in Turkey is analyzed:
• case A: Price elasticity ep = −0.7.
• case B: Price elasticity ep = −0.3.
For both cases we consider the following scenarios.
• Scenario 1: Nowadays plans of timing and construction of gas pipelines.
• Scenario 2: Time optimization for starting supply through “Blue Stream”.
• Scenario 3: Time optimization for starting supply through “Transcaspian”.
• Scenario 4: Game optimization of proﬁts for each player at all stages of the model:
investments, commercialization, supply.
Model simulations show that pipelines run not at the maximal capacity for major
period of their lifetimes. The question of optimizing maximal capacity of the planned
pipelines is analyzed in the following scenarios.
• Scenario 6: Optimization of maximal capacity for “Transcaspian”.
• Scenario 5: Optimization of maximal capacity for “Blue Stream”.
5.2 Case A, Scenario 1: Analysis of Nowadays Plans of Pipeline Projects
Let us consider a scenario in which nowadays plans (see Table 2) of pipelines construction
with the announced investments, commercialization times, supply capacities are analyzed
in order to estimate net present values (NPVs) of the projects. The results of this analysis
are shown on Figures 9,10 and 11. Figure 9 demonstrates that all gas pipelines except the
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Figure 9: Case A, Scenario 1: Gas supply (bcm/year).
“Blue Stream” will operate at a lower capacity than the maximal capacity. Figures 10
displays graphs of NPVs for gas pipeline projects. The dynamics of gas price is depicted
on Figure 10.
We use the following data in this scenario.
“Blue stream” delivery time 2003
“Transcaspian” delivery time 2002
“SWAP” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
Figure 9 elucidates the following eﬀects. First, LNG supply becomes unproﬁtable
and disappears as soon as the “Transcaspian” pipeline starts its gas supply. Second,
completion of the “Blue Stream” pipeline makes it unproﬁtable for Russia to supply gas
through “Bulgarpipe”. Third, in 2020 gas deliveries of “Blue Stream” will reach the
maximal capacity, but other new pipelines will not reach their maximal capacities, and
their supply will be increasing gradually due to growth of the market demand not reaching
the maximal scheduled capacity during their lifetimes.
Figure 10 depicts dynamics of net present values of gas pipeline projects. The analysis
shows that investments into “Blue Stream” will be paid back in 2022. For “Transcaspian”
the payback time is 2015, for “Ekarum” – 2035, for “Iranpipe” – 2027. “Ekarum” and
“Iranpipe” projects will bring proﬁts when lifetimes of “Blue stream” and “Transcaspian”
will expire. But this would happen only if during such a long time period no new pipelines
would be constructed to replace the old gas routes.
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Figure 10: Case A, Scenario 1: Net present values of gas pipeline projects.
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Figure 11: Case A, Scenario 1: Gas price.
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Figure 12: Case A, Scenario 2: Net present values of “Blue Stream” depending on delivery
time.
Figure 11 demonstrates the dynamics of gas price at the gas market in Turkey if
the nowadays pipeline plans would be implemented. The dynamics shows that at the
time moments when new suppliers enter the gas market the price falls down signiﬁcantly
from the level approximately equal to the world LNG price (60$/1000cm) and remains
at this low level until the “Transcaspian” pipeline completes its supply (the lifetime of
“Transcaspian” is 40 years).
5.3 Case A, Scenario 2: Time Optimization of Gas Deliveries for “Blue
Stream”
In this scenario the net present value of one pipeline is maximized under the assumption
that construction plans for other pipelines are ﬁxed. The “Blue Stream” and “Tran-
scaspian” pipelines are chosen as the main objects of optimization. The basic control
variable of optimization is the time of delivery – the commercialization time of invest-
ments into a pipeline project.
We use the following data in this scenario.
“Blue stream” delivery time optimization
“Transcaspian” delivery time 2002
“Ekarum” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
Figure 12 shows net present values of “Blue Stream” depending on delivery time. Each
curve corresponds to delivery time in the interval 2002-2018 partitioned with the step 2
–23 –


	


	


	






 
 	  	  	  	  	 	
     ! "
Figure 13: Case A, Scenario 2: Gas deliveries if construction of “Blue Stream” is completed
in 2009.
years. The curve corresponding to the optimal net present value of “Blue Stream” is
depicted by the bold line. This analysis shows that if competitors of “Blue Stream” ﬁx
their nowadays construction plans then it is optimal to start operation of “Blue stream”
in 2009. The graphs of supply of gas suppliers are shown on Figure 13. In this scenario
Russia is exploiting the “Bulgarpipe” until 2009; then gas deliveries are maintained only
through “Blue Stream”.
Net present values of gas suppliers are shown on Figure 14. Rapid growth of proﬁts
on the interval 2040-2050 of “Blue Stream”, “Iranpipe”, and “SWAP” pipeline is caused
by expiration of lifetime of “Transcaspian” pipeline.
5.4 Case A, Scenario 3: Time Optimization of Gas Deliveries for “Tran-
scaspian”
We use the following data in this scenario.
“Blue Stream” delivery time 2003
“Transcaspian” delivery time optimization
“Ekarum” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
Results of optimization procedure for “Transcaspian” are shown on Figure 15.
–24 –

	









	
		

	
  
      
 
   
    !  "#$ %
Figure 14: Case A, Scenario 2: Net present values of gas suppliers if construction of “Blue
Stream” is completed in 2009.
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Figure 15: Case A, Scenario 3: Net present values of “Transcaspian” depending on delivery
time.
–25 –
Each curve on Figure 15 corresponds to delivery time in the interval 2002-2018 par-
titioned with the step 2 years. The optimal time of gas deliveries for “Transcaspian” is
also 2009 as in Scenario 2 for “Blue Stream”. The curve of optimal net present value for
“Transcaspian” is depicted by the bold line.
5.5 Case A, Scenario 4: Game-Optimization of Commercialization
Times
We use the following data in this scenario.
“Blue Stream” delivery time optimization
“Transcaspian” delivery time optimization
“Ekarum” delivery time optimization
“Iranpipe” delivery time optimization
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
The recursive game-optimization procedure for ﬁnding Nash equilibrium in the space
of commercialization times (see Section 2) can be tracked by steps. At the ﬁrst step of
optimization the commercialization times shift to the the following values: 9 years for
“Blue Stream” instead of 3-4 years of nowadays plans, and 8.5 years for “Transcaspian”
instead of the planned 2 years. Shift of the commercialization time for “Transcaspian” is
quite essential. This circumstance drastically changes the situation at the second step for
“Blue Stream”, and its commercialization is accelerated to 2004. This happens because
“Blue Stream” does not compete with the existing pipeline “Bulgarpipe” from Russia to
Turkey. Controlling supply through both pipelines Gazprom is able to keep gas price at
the LNG world price level, and thus make “Blue Stream” gas deliveries highly proﬁtable.
In this scenario “Blue Stream” does not operate at its maximal capacity during the ﬁrst
5 years and LNG deliveries are proﬁtable till 2009 when other gas suppliers enter the
market.
Figure 16 shows gas deliveries of competitive pipelines.
Figure 17 depicts net present values of gas suppliers in the game scenario.
One can see from Figure 17 that the payback time of investments for “Blue Stream”
is 2020. For other suppliers the time interval between the delivery time and the payback
time is approximately the same – around 20 years.
The dynamics of gas price in the game scenario is shown on Figure 18.
One can see that the market gas price stabilizes at the level of approximately
73$/1000cm in the period 2009–20045 when gas is delivered by several competitors. But
in the period 2004–2009 when “Blue Stream” is a monopolist of gas deliveries gas prices
oscillates around the level of the world LNG price.
5.6 Optimization of Maximal Capacity
Let us consider the inverse problem: to optimize the maximal capacity of pipelines if
the commercialization times are ﬁxed. We implement such optimization for two main
competitors – “Blue Stream” and “Transcaspian.”
In the optimization procedure the net present value of a gas project is considered as
a function of pipeline capacity. More precisely, it is assumed that the cost of pipeline
construction Wli is a linear function of its capacity Mli.
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Figure 16: Case A, Scenario 4: Gas deliveries of competitive pipelines.
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Figure 17: Case A, Scenario 4: Net present values of gas suppliers in the game scenario.
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Figure 18: Case A, Scenario 4: Dynamics of gas price in the game scenario.
5.6.1 Scenario 5: Optimization of “Blue Stream” Maximal Capacity
The speciﬁc data for this scenario is given in the following table.
“Blue Stream” delivery time 2004
“Transcaspian” delivery time 2009
“Ekarum” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
“Blue Stream” capacity optimization
“Transcaspian” capacity 31 bcm/year
The analysis shows that optimal capacity of “Blue Stream” is 15 bcm/year instead of
the proposed 14 bcm/year, but it will operate at this capacity only starting from 2025
(see Figure 19).
5.6.2 Scenario 6: Optimization of “Transcaspian” Maximal Capacity
We use the following data for this scenario.
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Figure 19: Case A, Scenario 5: Supply by competitive pipelines under optimization of
“Blue Stream” maximal capacity.
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Figure 20: Case A, Scenario 6: Supply by competitive pipelines under optimization of
“Transcaspian” maximal capacity.
“Blue Stream” delivery time 2004
“Transcaspian” delivery time 2009
“Ekarum” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.7
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 400
“Blue Stream” maximal capacity 14 bcm/year
“Transcaspian” maximal capacity optimization
Optimization of “Transcaspian” maximal capacity is conducted for the case when its
construction is completed in 2009. If construction of pipeline is completed in 2009 the
optimal maximal capacity would be 27 bcm/year instead of the proposed 31 bcm/year.
The results of optimization procedure for this scenarios is shown on Figure 20.
Let us stress that in these simulations the level of investments for each competitor is
ﬁxed and only maximal capacity of pipelines is optimized, and thus delivery times may be
not optimal.
5.7 Case B: Price Elasticity −0.3
We consider the case with gas price elasticity equal to −0.3. This level of elasticity might
be realistic for developing countries in early stages of development of the gas market.
Simulations show that for the scenario with the price elasticity of −0.3 instead of −0.7 the
gas price oscillates near the exogenously given LNG price (see Figure 21). This behavior of
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Figure 21: Case B, Scenario 1: Dynamics of gas price.
the gas price can be explained by relatively large value of proportion between gas demand
elasticity 1.25 and gas price elasticity −0.3. In this case the restricted gas supply through
pipelines enhances the gas price to the level of LNG world price.
5.7.1 Scenario 1: Analysis of Nowadays Plans of Pipeline Projects
First we analyze the nowadays plans of pipeline projects without performing any opti-
mization.
The following data is used for this scenario.
“Blue Stream” delivery time 2003
“Transcaspian” delivery time 2002
“Ekarum” delivery time 2010
“Iranpipe” delivery time 2009
Price elasticity ep -0.3
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 50
Figure 22 shows that the gas pipelines share the market almost equally. The gas
pipelines run at a lower level than the maximal capacity.
At the initial stage of exploitation of pipelines gas deliveries are lower than the maximal
capacity and the gas price remains at a high level (see Figure 21). In this period the proﬁts
of gas deliveries are accumulated with high rates (see Figure 23).
In this case the payback time of investments depends rather on their amounts than on
the level of gas deliveries.
Case B, Scenario 4: Search of Nash Equilibrium in the Game of Timing
We use the following data in this scenario.
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Figure 22: Case B, Scenario 1: Gas supply.
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Figure 23: Case B, Scenario 1: Net present values of gas suppliers.
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Figure 24: Case B, Scenario 4: Supply by competitive pipelines.
“Blue Stream” delivery time optimization
“Transcaspian” delivery time optimization
“Ekarum” delivery time optimization
“Iranpipe” delivery time optimization
Price elasticity ep -0.3
GDP elasticity ey 1.25
Demand scale A 50
Optimization of investments in a scenario with price elasticity of gas demand ep = −0.3
gives the following results. It appears (see Figures 24, 25) that for all suppliers it is optimal
to start gas supply around 2009. Therefore the coordinates of Nash equilibrium in the
game of timing are approximately equal.
In this scenario the competitors share the gas market equally. At the moment when
a new gas pipeline supplier enters the market, the LNG deliveries decrease but do not
disappear completely as it happens in the game scenario with price elasticity ep = −0.7.
This fact can be explained by relatively high level of the market gas price in this scenario.
5.8 Sensitivity Analysis with respect to Discount Rate
The discount rate is introduced in the model to calculate net present values of gas pipeline
projects. One can estimate the conﬁdence interval for the discount rate, simulate the
model for diﬀerent values from this interval and make sensitivity analysis. The results of
sensitivity analysis can be summarized as follows.
• As the discount rate increases, the optimal delivery time for gas pipelines slightly
decreases, But after some critical value it starts to increase and for large discount
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Figure 25: Case B, Scenario 3: Net present values of competitors.
rates tends to inﬁnity since pipeline projects are unproﬁtable.
• Sensitivity analysis for “Blue Stream” project demonstrates robustness of solutions:
optimal delivery time, optimal supply, net present values, with respect to change of
discount rate.
• Simulations for “Transcaspian” pipeline with diﬀerent discount rates show that val-
ues of optimal solution change twice quicker than the same values of “Blue Stream”
and it is necessary to be more careful in analysis of eﬀectiveness of “Transcapian”
project.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to describe a new, game-theoretical model for analysis of in-
vestment plans into international gas transmission lines and to apply this model to the
existing and planned gas pipelines to Turkey. The proposed model consists of three levels
of analysis. At the ﬁrst level, current plans of gas pipeline projects are examined and net
present values of investment plans are estimated. In the second stage, varying the delivery
time for the ﬁxed gas pipeline project, we solve the problem of maximization of the net
present value of investment plans under condition that for competitive pipeline projects
the delivery time is ﬁxed. At the third level, recursive algorithms are implemented for
searching Nash equilibria by controlling the level of gas supply and delivery time. That
recursive algorithm is based on the best reply concept: at each step of the algorithm all
players maximize their proﬁts taking into account the reaction of other players on their
–34 –
decisions on optimal timing of gas supply. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium at
the level of gas supply and outline the algorithm for ﬁnding equilibrium and determining
the market gas price. We also provide an approach to search Nash equilibrium of commer-
cialization times for gas pipeline projects. This algorithm is also based on the best reply
investment policies implemented by competitors.
The method is applied to study the gas market in Turkey and analyzes planned gas
pipeline projects from Russia, Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey. It appears that if the
current plans of the proposed gas pipeline projects will be realized then the optimal gas
deliveries for almost all pipelines except “Blue Stream” from Russia will not reach the
maximal capacities. In the game scenarios for ﬁnding Nash equilibria of commercialization
times, it appears to be optimal for the Russian Gazprom company to build its “Blue
Stream” pipeline according to current plans but Turkmenistan should delay the operation
start of “Transcaspian” pipeline until 2009. It also turns out to be optimal to run gas
deliveries through the “Transcaspian ” pipeline at a level less than full capacity during a
considerable period of time. It means that the planned capacity of “Transcaspian” pipeline
is too high and can be reduced. The results turn out to be very sensitive to changes in
the price elasticity of gas demand and less sensitive to changes in the discount rate.
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Units
mmcf: million cubic feet
bcm: billion cubic meters
bcf: billion cubic feet
1 bcm = 35.31466672 bcf
tcf: trillion cubic feet
